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The Cognitive Estimation Ability: A Matter of Discuss
The first attempt to measure cognitive estimation abilities was made by Shallice and Evans (1978),
who developed the Cognitive Estimation Test, consisting of a set of questions which requires
appropriate reasoning abilities. The authors stressed the link between executive functions and
estimation skills, finding out that patients with frontal lobe damages performed poorly on the
proposed task; although the relation between cognitive estimation ability and executive functions
is been a matter of discussion (Spreen and Strauss, 1998; Appollonio et al., 2003; Barabassy et al.,
2010; D’Aniello et al., 2015), it has been recently supported by MacPherson et al. (2014), who
developed a new version of the cognitive estimation test, proving its suitability for assessing
executive dysfunction; in a nutshell, it seems that the process of estimation requires a complex
pattern of abilities, including executive functions.
Brand et al. (2003) proposed that cognitive estimation would follow a route from a specific
representation in the working memory to an activation of information from the long-termmemory
and- subsequently—a “plausibility check” of the generated answer by a central processing control.
According to this, a cognitive estimation task would involve (i) a central processing control, which
defines the appropriate strategies to solve the problem, (ii) working memory, which applies these
strategies, (iii) long term declarative memory, where the necessary information for answering the
task are stored.
We accounted this idea in a detailed cognitive model (Figure 1) that may enclose the cognitive
domains involved in the estimation process; furthermore, a more detailed characterization of the
central processing control described by Brand et al. (2003) has been provided.
A Revised Model
Part I: Semantic Knowledge and its Relation with the Hypothesis of
Cognitive Reserve
A verbal question relative to a cognitive estimation (e.g., “what is the average length of a man’s
spine?”) should firstly activate the central executive of working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974;
Baddeley, 2000), which is crucial in order to set a link between the information provided by the
question and the semantic knowledge. The established interface between working memory and
semantic knowledge is exploited by the first level of executive processing, the reasoning abilities: the
result of this stage is the formulation of a hypothesis. Depending on the question’s contents (e.g.,
time, quantity, size or other type of information) the reasoning system would recruit additional
executive skills, such as spatial abilities, planning, problem solving, numerical skills, experiences, and
mental imagery (Horacek et al., 2010). The hypothesis generated by this complex process, in which
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FIGURE 1 | Model of the cognitive estimation process.
the previous cognitive modules interact with each other, is then
checked by the second main level of executive processing, that is,
monitoring: at this stage, the formulated hypothesis is compared
with all the information gleaned during the process in order to
verify its consistency and—once accepted—proposed as the final
answer. In case the hypothesis is considered as an inconsistent
or inadequate one, it is sent back to the reasoning process.
This process substantially differs from reasoning abilities applied
on unknown information in novel contexts (fluid intelligence,
Cattell, 1967), about which, for example, the Weigl Color-Form
Sorting Test (Goldstein and Scheerer, 1941) would represent
an example (Hobson et al., 2007). On the contrary, cognitive
estimation is strictly linked (and depends) to a certain amount
of previously acquired knowledge and experience as well as
the ability to use it (Della Sala et al., 2003): this combination
of abilities could be defined as crystallized intelligence (Cattell,
1967).
The definition of crystallized intelligence as stated above is
surprisingly similar to the widely known concept of Cognitive
Reserve. According to Stern (2009), cognitive reserve can be
defined as the amount of cognitive loss that can be sustained by
brain-damaged patients before reaching a threshold at which a
clear cognitive impairment becomes evident.
The estimation of cognitive reserve has been traditionally
conducted using tests of crystallized intelligence, such as
vocabulary, reading ability and general knowledge (Cattell, 1971;
Sumowski et al., 2010). The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—
Information Subtest (Wechsler, 1997) has been widely used as an
appropriate proxy for cognitive reserve, although it was originally
intended as an instrument for assessing crystallized intelligence
(Franchow et al., 2013): as confirmed by Stern (2007), measures
of crystallized intelligence could provide a reliable instrument for
assessing one’s cognitive reserve, because they serve in capturing
mature cognitive ability, even at a premorbid level (Sachdev
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and Valenzuela, 2009). What seems to be increasingly clear is
that crystallized intelligence could represent almost part of the
cognitive reserve construct, which is likely to comprise other
factors including educational attainment (Stern et al., 1992; Stern,
2002; Tucker and Stern, 2011) and certain cognitive domains
such as verbal fluency, reasoning, attention and working memory
functions (Roldán-Tapia et al., 2012).
Given these findings, we hypothesize that assessing cognitive
estimation abilities might be considered a reliable strategy for
measuring important aspects of cognitive reserve: in fact, it could
be used as a measure of the person’s body of knowledge and
experiences (Della Sala et al., 2004), independently from aging
(Della Sala et al., 2004;MacPherson et al., 2014), and—at the same
time—as a sensitive instrument for assessing certain cognitive
domains such as working memory and semantic knowledge
(D’Aniello et al., 2015). The hypothesis that semantic knowledge
is part of the cognitive estimation ability would be confirmed
by studies relative to patients with Alzheimer’s Disease (Della
Sala et al., 2004; Levinoff et al., 2006; Barabassy et al., 2007;
Khodarahimi and Rasti, 2011), Mild Cognitive Impairment
(Levinoff et al., 2006), and Korsakoff’s syndrome (Taylor and
O’Carroll, 1995; Brand et al., 2003), in which higher amount of
errors in the estimation process comparing to healthy groups
were reported.
Part II: Reasoning Ability and the Relationship
with Bizarre Answers
The second part of the model regards reasoning, i.e., the ability to
put together the information from other cognitive domain into
the cognitive estimation, andmonitoring, i.e., the process involves
a systematic and continuous way of the reasoning process and to
furnish a feedback about the results. According to our model, if
the primary output from the reasoning process is not put through
the monitoring stage and, for example, it is not checked with
further everyday information (Shallice and Evans, 1978), but is
directly provided as a result of the estimation, the final output
would be a bizarre answer: it is an unreasonable and extremely
inaccurate answer which was generally interpreted as a clue of
pervasive impairment in cognitive estimation (Della Sala et al.,
2003). Besides in previous studies relating to cognitive estimation
(Appollonio et al., 2003; Khodarahimi and Rasti, 2011) less
attention was generally given to bizarre answers (probably due
to some difficulties in outlining an operational and actionable
definition of the bizarreness index) it could be considered a
remarkable clue about the executive domains involvement in
the estimation ability: indeed Parkinson’s disease (Appollonio
et al., 2003), fronto-temporal dementia (Mendez et al., 1998),
and focal frontal lesions (Shallice and Evans, 1978; Taylor and
O’Carroll, 1995; MacPherson et al., 2014), but also schizophrenia
(Khodarahimi and Rasti, 2011) and major depressive disorder
patients (Barabassy et al., 2010) reported a poor performance
in the cognitive estimation ability, and specifically an higher
number of bizarre answers, since the lack of efficacy of executive
functions involved in the cognitive estimation process.
Conclusion
According to the present model, cognitive estimation is neither
a pure ability nor a specific measure of executive functions,
but it also require e certain amount of semantic knowledge
and the ability to access to it. Given this, the Cognitive
Estimation Test (Shallice and Evans, 1978 and following
versions) may be considered as a useful instrument for the
assessment of crystallized intelligence and of cognitive reserve
to some extent. We hope this theoretical hypothesis will
provide new insights prompting future research toward the
understanding of the cognitive estimation process, together with
its potential application as an instrument for assessing cognitive
reserve.
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